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Astract
We construct an open-economy DSGE model with a banking sector to ana-
lyse the impact of the recent credit crunch on a small open economy. In our
model the banking sector operates under monopolistic competition, collects
deposits and grants collateralized loans. Collateral eﬀects amplify monetary
policy actions, interest rate stickiness dampens the transmission of interest
rates, and ﬁnancial shocks generate non-negligible real and nominal eﬀects.
As an application we estimate the model for Poland - a typical small open
economy. According to the results, ﬁnancial shocks had a substantial, though
not overwhelming, impact on the Polish economy during the 2008/09 crisis,
lowering GDP by approximately 1.5 percent.
JEL: E32, E44, E52
Keywords: credit crunch, monetary policy, DSGE with banking sectorNon-technical summary
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Non-technical summary
Non-technical Summary
The ﬁnancial crisis 2001-2009 hit emerging market economies through mul-
tiple channels. These include: (1) decline in external demand for exported
goods; (2) increase of the risk premium on foreign borrowing; (3) change
in crediting policies of the banking sector (which involves the increase in
spreads between lending and borrowing interest rates and credit rationing).
Those shocks had a huge impact on the economies worldwide, including
Poland. Our paper aims at disentangling the eﬀects of those shocks on the
Polish economy during the crisis. We believe that this is crucial for designing
the proper policy response to the crisis.
We present a model that can tackle this problem. We extend the stan-
dard small open economy new Keynesian DSGE model for the existence of
a ﬁnancial sector. We proceed along the lines of Iacoviello (2004). Our eco-
nomy is populated by three types of agents: patient consumers, impatient
consumers and impatient entrepreneurs. Patient consumers provide savings,
which are used by impatient consumers to purchase housing and by impatient
entrepreneurs to purchase capital. Both, consumers and entrepreneurs can
borrow only subject to collateral constraints and those constraints are bin-
ding. Collateral constraints are subject to exogenous shocks. The banking
sector serves as an intermediary between lenders and borrowers. There is
monopolistic competition in the banking sector and interest rates are sticky
thus, there are spreads between lending and borrowing rates. Furthermore,
the spreads are subject to exogenous shocks. Banks can also borrow in the
international markets at the world interest rate plus a risk premium. The
production sector is standard. Entrepreneurs combine capital and labour to
produce wholesale goods, which are sold in a perfectly competitive market.
Next, intermediate good producers diﬀerentiate the wholesale goods and sell
them in monopolistically competitive markets. Then domestic and foreign
intermediate goods are combined into ﬁnal goods in a two step aggregation.
Also some of the intermediate goods are exported.
We estimate the model using Polish data for the period 1Q1996 – 2Q2009
with Bayesian methods. The estimation allows for identiﬁcation of the rela-
tive strength of diﬀerent shocks aﬀecting the economy in our sample. Next,
using this identiﬁcation we answer our main question, how much the credit
crunch contributed to GDP decline. To do so we run counterfactual simu-
lations, by turning oﬀ all the ﬁnancial sector shocks starting from 3Q2008
(Lehman Brothers collapse). Our simulations show that credit crunch lo-
wered the level of GDP by 1.5 percent at its highest impact. We compare
this result with the impact of external shocks, by running a similar coun-
terfactual experiment (with the external shocks turned oﬀ). We ﬁnd that
the external shocks lowered GDP by 2 percent. Thus the impact of ﬁnancial
sector turmoil on the Polish economy was important but not overwhelming.Non-technical summary Non-technical summary
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1 Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis aﬀected economies worldwide. It originated from pro-
blems with subprime mortgages in the United States, but spread soon to
international ﬁnancial markets. Several ﬁnancial institutions had to be bai-
led out by governments. Moreover, the disease soon started to spread to the
real economy. Its impact was transmitted i.a. via negative wealth eﬀects
(housing and stock market busts), decreased consumer conﬁdence and the
crunch in credit markets. Moreover, in the case of small open economies
decreased demand for exports and limited access to external funding further
contributed to the slowdown1. As a result the world economy entered its
worst recession since World War II. It is not possible, and probably never
will be, to tell precisely how various channels contributed to the weakening
of economic activity in various countries. In particular, it seems unlikely
to measure how much of the slowdown in consumption and investment ex-
penditure was due to widespread panic - a sort of animal instinct behaviour
among households and investors. In this paper we undertake a more decent
exercise: we only assess the role played in transmitting the slowdown by the
banking sector. To do this we construct a general equilibrium model with a
banking sector.
The literature incorporating a ﬁnancial sector into macroeconomic mo-
dels has been developing fast over the last two decades. A seminal position
is Bernanke and Gertler (1989) where ﬁnancial frictions have been incor-
porated into a general equilibrium model. This approach has been further
developed and merged with the New-Keynesian framework by Bernanke et
al. (1996), becoming the workhorse ﬁnancial frictions model in the 2000’s.
In this model frictions arise because monitoring the loan applicant is costly -
this generates an“external ﬁnance premium”and, hence increases the lending
rate. This idea has been extensively used i.a. by Choi and Cook (2004) to
analyse the balance sheet channel in emerging markets or by Christiano et al.
(2007) to study business cycle implications of ﬁnancial frictions. Goodfriend
and McCallum (2007) provided an endogenous explanation for steady state
diﬀerentials between lending and money market rates. C´ urdia and Wood-
ford (2008) derived optimal monetary policy in the presence of time-varying
interest rate spreads in a model with heterogeneous agents.
A second important direction was introduced by the seminal paper of
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), lately incorporated into the monetary busi-
ness cycle model by Iacoviello (2005). This line of research concentrates on
quantities rather than prices of loans. In the Iacoviello model households
accumulate housing wealth, which can be used as loan collateral. Collateral
constraints capture the eﬀects of quantitative restrictions generated by the
banking sector. An important application is Gerali et al. (2009) where a mo-
del with collateral constraints and monopolistic competition in the banking
1For a thorough analysis of the crisis see e.g BIS (2009).
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sector was used to analyse i.a. the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on monetary
transmission and a credit crunch scenario. The eruption of the ﬁnancial cri-
sis contributed to even more interest in these models and probably we will
see several new studies in this ﬁeld soon.
Our model is written in the spirit of Iacoviello (2005) and Gerali et al.
(2009). Apart from ﬁnancial sector issues it has the standard features of new
Keynesian models (e.g. Erceg et al., 2000, Smets and Wouters, 2003) inclu-
ding monopolistically competitive markets and nominal rigidities in goods
and labour markets. We contribute to the existing ﬁnancial frictions litera-
ture by incorporating the model into a small open economy framework (e.g.
Gal´ ı and Monacelli, 2005, Altig et al., 2005, Christiano et al., 2005, Adolfson
et al., 2005). This seems important, since contemporaneous economies can
rarely be treated as closed. Our economy is populated by patient (saving)
and impatient (borrowing) households as well as (borrowing) entrepreneurs.
Consumers consume and accumulate housing. Entrepreneurs produce homo-
geneous goods that are diﬀerentiated by monopolistically competitive retai-
lers and merged with foreign goods before they are used for consumption or
investment. Monopolistically competitive banks collect deposits, grant loans
and have access to domestic and international money markets. In terms of
ﬁnancial frictions both, collateral constraints (on housing or capital) and
interest rate spreads play a role and are able to generate non-negligible real
and nominal eﬀects.
Figure 1: Exports and GDP in Poland (y-o-y).













As an application we estimate the model using data for Poland - a typical
small open economy. This country has been substantially (though probably
somewhat less than most EU countries) aﬀected by the crisis. GDP growth is
declined from 5.0% in 2008 to 1.8% in 2009 and exports contracted by 9.1%
in 2009 (Figure 1). The slowdown was deepened by the restrictive behaviour
of Polish banks, who signiﬁcantly increased the cost of borrowing and addi-
tionally tightened lending conditions. It should be noted that, similarly to
several other small open economies, the behaviour of Polish banks was dri-
sector was used to analyse i.a. the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on monetary
transmission and a credit crunch scenario. The eruption of the ﬁnancial cri-
sis contributed to even more interest in these models and probably we will
see several new studies in this ﬁeld soon.
Our model is written in the spirit of Iacoviello (2005) and Gerali et al.
(2009). Apart from ﬁnancial sector issues it has the standard features of new
Keynesian models (e.g. Erceg et al., 2000, Smets and Wouters, 2003) inclu-
ding monopolistically competitive markets and nominal rigidities in goods
and labour markets. We contribute to the existing ﬁnancial frictions litera-
ture by incorporating the model into a small open economy framework (e.g.
Gal´ ı and Monacelli, 2005, Altig et al., 2005, Christiano et al., 2005, Adolfson
et al., 2005). This seems important, since contemporaneous economies can
rarely be treated as closed. Our economy is populated by patient (saving)
and impatient (borrowing) households as well as (borrowing) entrepreneurs.
Consumers consume and accumulate housing. Entrepreneurs produce homo-
geneous goods that are diﬀerentiated by monopolistically competitive retai-
lers and merged with foreign goods before they are used for consumption or
investment. Monopolistically competitive banks collect deposits, grant loans
and have access to domestic and international money markets. In terms of
ﬁnancial frictions both, collateral constraints (on housing or capital) and
interest rate spreads play a role and are able to generate non-negligible real
and nominal eﬀects.
Figure 1: Exports and GDP in Poland (y-o-y).













As an application we estimate the model using data for Poland - a typical
small open economy. This country has been substantially (though probably
somewhat less than most EU countries) aﬀected by the crisis. GDP growth is
declined from 5.0% in 2008 to 1.8% in 2009 and exports contracted by 9.1%
in 2009 (Figure 1). The slowdown was deepened by the restrictive behaviour
of Polish banks, who signiﬁcantly increased the cost of borrowing and addi-
tionally tightened lending conditions. It should be noted that, similarly to
several other small open economies, the behaviour of Polish banks was dri-
sector was used to analyse i.a. the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on monetary
transmission and a credit crunch scenario. The eruption of the ﬁnancial cri-
sis contributed to even more interest in these models and probably we will
see several new studies in this ﬁeld soon.
Our model is written in the spirit of Iacoviello (2005) and Gerali et al.
(2009). Apart from ﬁnancial sector issues it has the standard features of new
Keynesian models (e.g. Erceg et al., 2000, Smets and Wouters, 2003) inclu-
ding monopolistically competitive markets and nominal rigidities in goods
and labour markets. We contribute to the existing ﬁnancial frictions litera-
ture by incorporating the model into a small open economy framework (e.g.
Gal´ ı and Monacelli, 2005, Altig et al., 2005, Christiano et al., 2005, Adolfson
et al., 2005). This seems important, since contemporaneous economies can
rarely be treated as closed. Our economy is populated by patient (saving)
and impatient (borrowing) households as well as (borrowing) entrepreneurs.
Consumers consume and accumulate housing. Entrepreneurs produce homo-
geneous goods that are diﬀerentiated by monopolistically competitive retai-
lers and merged with foreign goods before they are used for consumption or
investment. Monopolistically competitive banks collect deposits, grant loans
and have access to domestic and international money markets. In terms of
ﬁnancial frictions both, collateral constraints (on housing or capital) and
interest rate spreads play a role and are able to generate non-negligible real
and nominal eﬀects.
Figure 1: Exports and GDP in Poland (y-o-y).













As an application we estimate the model using data for Poland - a typical
small open economy. This country has been substantially (though probably
somewhat less than most EU countries) aﬀected by the crisis. GDP growth is
declined from 5.0% in 2008 to 1.8% in 2009 and exports contracted by 9.1%
in 2009 (Figure 1). The slowdown was deepened by the restrictive behaviour
of Polish banks, who signiﬁcantly increased the cost of borrowing and addi-
tionally tightened lending conditions. It should be noted that, similarly to
several other small open economies, the behaviour of Polish banks was dri-
sector was used to analyse i.a. the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on monetary
transmission and a credit crunch scenario. The eruption of the ﬁnancial cri-
sis contributed to even more interest in these models and probably we will
see several new studies in this ﬁeld soon.
Our model is written in the spirit of Iacoviello (2005) and Gerali et al.
(2009). Apart from ﬁnancial sector issues it has the standard features of new
Keynesian models (e.g. Erceg et al., 2000, Smets and Wouters, 2003) inclu-
ding monopolistically competitive markets and nominal rigidities in goods
and labour markets. We contribute to the existing ﬁnancial frictions litera-
ture by incorporating the model into a small open economy framework (e.g.
Gal´ ı and Monacelli, 2005, Altig et al., 2005, Christiano et al., 2005, Adolfson
et al., 2005). This seems important, since contemporaneous economies can
rarely be treated as closed. Our economy is populated by patient (saving)
and impatient (borrowing) households as well as (borrowing) entrepreneurs.
Consumers consume and accumulate housing. Entrepreneurs produce homo-
geneous goods that are diﬀerentiated by monopolistically competitive retai-
lers and merged with foreign goods before they are used for consumption or
investment. Monopolistically competitive banks collect deposits, grant loans
and have access to domestic and international money markets. In terms of
ﬁnancial frictions both, collateral constraints (on housing or capital) and
interest rate spreads play a role and are able to generate non-negligible real
and nominal eﬀects.
Figure 1: Exports and GDP in Poland (y-o-y).













As an application we estimate the model using data for Poland - a typical
small open economy. This country has been substantially (though probably
somewhat less than most EU countries) aﬀected by the crisis. GDP growth is
declined from 5.0% in 2008 to 1.8% in 2009 and exports contracted by 9.1%
in 2009 (Figure 1). The slowdown was deepened by the restrictive behaviour
of Polish banks, who signiﬁcantly increased the cost of borrowing and addi-
tionally tightened lending conditions. It should be noted that, similarly to








2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
GDP Exports
%
sector was used to analyse i.a. the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on monetary
transmission and a credit crunch scenario. The eruption of the ﬁnancial cri-
sis contributed to even more interest in these models and probably we will
see several new studies in this ﬁeld soon.
Our model is written in the spirit of Iacoviello (2005) and Gerali et al.
(2009). Apart from ﬁnancial sector issues it has the standard features of new
Keynesian models (e.g. Erceg et al., 2000, Smets and Wouters, 2003) inclu-
ding monopolistically competitive markets and nominal rigidities in goods
and labour markets. We contribute to the existing ﬁnancial frictions litera-
ture by incorporating the model into a small open economy framework (e.g.
Gal´ ı and Monacelli, 2005, Altig et al., 2005, Christiano et al., 2005, Adolfson
et al., 2005). This seems important, since contemporaneous economies can
rarely be treated as closed. Our economy is populated by patient (saving)
and impatient (borrowing) households as well as (borrowing) entrepreneurs.
Consumers consume and accumulate housing. Entrepreneurs produce homo-
geneous goods that are diﬀerentiated by monopolistically competitive retai-
lers and merged with foreign goods before they are used for consumption or
investment. Monopolistically competitive banks collect deposits, grant loans
and have access to domestic and international money markets. In terms of
ﬁnancial frictions both, collateral constraints (on housing or capital) and
interest rate spreads play a role and are able to generate non-negligible real
and nominal eﬀects.
Figure 1: Exports and GDP in Poland (y-o-y).













As an application we estimate the model using data for Poland - a typical
small open economy. This country has been substantially (though probably
somewhat less than most EU countries) aﬀected by the crisis. GDP growth is
declined from 5.0% in 2008 to 1.8% in 2009 and exports contracted by 9.1%
in 2009 (Figure 1). The slowdown was deepened by the restrictive behaviour
of Polish banks, who signiﬁcantly increased the cost of borrowing and addi-
tionally tightened lending conditions. It should be noted that, similarly to
several other small open economies, the behaviour of Polish banks was dri-Introduction
N a t i o n a l   B a n k   o f   P o l a n d 10
1
sector was used to analyse i.a. the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on monetary
transmission and a credit crunch scenario. The eruption of the ﬁnancial cri-
sis contributed to even more interest in these models and probably we will
see several new studies in this ﬁeld soon.
Our model is written in the spirit of Iacoviello (2005) and Gerali et al.
(2009). Apart from ﬁnancial sector issues it has the standard features of new
Keynesian models (e.g. Erceg et al., 2000, Smets and Wouters, 2003) inclu-
ding monopolistically competitive markets and nominal rigidities in goods
and labour markets. We contribute to the existing ﬁnancial frictions litera-
ture by incorporating the model into a small open economy framework (e.g.
Gal´ ı and Monacelli, 2005, Altig et al., 2005, Christiano et al., 2005, Adolfson
et al., 2005). This seems important, since contemporaneous economies can
rarely be treated as closed. Our economy is populated by patient (saving)
and impatient (borrowing) households as well as (borrowing) entrepreneurs.
Consumers consume and accumulate housing. Entrepreneurs produce homo-
geneous goods that are diﬀerentiated by monopolistically competitive retai-
lers and merged with foreign goods before they are used for consumption or
investment. Monopolistically competitive banks collect deposits, grant loans
and have access to domestic and international money markets. In terms of
ﬁnancial frictions both, collateral constraints (on housing or capital) and
interest rate spreads play a role and are able to generate non-negligible real
and nominal eﬀects.
Figure 1: Exports and GDP in Poland (y-o-y).













As an application we estimate the model using data for Poland - a typical
small open economy. This country has been substantially (though probably
somewhat less than most EU countries) aﬀected by the crisis. GDP growth is
declined from 5.0% in 2008 to 1.8% in 2009 and exports contracted by 9.1%
in 2009 (Figure 1). The slowdown was deepened by the restrictive behaviour
of Polish banks, who signiﬁcantly increased the cost of borrowing and addi-
tionally tightened lending conditions. It should be noted that, similarly to
several other small open economies, the behaviour of Polish banks was dri-
sector was used to analyse i.a. the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on monetary
transmission and a credit crunch scenario. The eruption of the ﬁnancial cri-
sis contributed to even more interest in these models and probably we will
see several new studies in this ﬁeld soon.
Our model is written in the spirit of Iacoviello (2005) and Gerali et al.
(2009). Apart from ﬁnancial sector issues it has the standard features of new
Keynesian models (e.g. Erceg et al., 2000, Smets and Wouters, 2003) inclu-
ding monopolistically competitive markets and nominal rigidities in goods
and labour markets. We contribute to the existing ﬁnancial frictions litera-
ture by incorporating the model into a small open economy framework (e.g.
Gal´ ı and Monacelli, 2005, Altig et al., 2005, Christiano et al., 2005, Adolfson
et al., 2005). This seems important, since contemporaneous economies can
rarely be treated as closed. Our economy is populated by patient (saving)
and impatient (borrowing) households as well as (borrowing) entrepreneurs.
Consumers consume and accumulate housing. Entrepreneurs produce homo-
geneous goods that are diﬀerentiated by monopolistically competitive retai-
lers and merged with foreign goods before they are used for consumption or
investment. Monopolistically competitive banks collect deposits, grant loans
and have access to domestic and international money markets. In terms of
ﬁnancial frictions both, collateral constraints (on housing or capital) and
interest rate spreads play a role and are able to generate non-negligible real
and nominal eﬀects.
Figure 1: Exports and GDP in Poland (y-o-y).













As an application we estimate the model using data for Poland - a typical
small open economy. This country has been substantially (though probably
somewhat less than most EU countries) aﬀected by the crisis. GDP growth is
declined from 5.0% in 2008 to 1.8% in 2009 and exports contracted by 9.1%
in 2009 (Figure 1). The slowdown was deepened by the restrictive behaviour
of Polish banks, who signiﬁcantly increased the cost of borrowing and addi-
tionally tightened lending conditions. It should be noted that, similarly to
several other small open economies, the behaviour of Polish banks was dri-
Figure 2: New loans to households and entrepreneurs (PLN mn, RHS) and
collateral requirements (LHS)∗.





















LTV_Enterprise LTV_Mortgage Enterprise loans Household loans
Source: NBP
∗Collateral requirements based on Senior Loan Oﬃcer Survey. The LTV series refer to the share of oﬃcers who claim
less restrictive collateral requirements minus the share of those who claim more restrictive requirements, see NBP (2009).
ven by external rather than internal factors. Polish banks have not invested
funds in toxic assets, subprime lending was not excessive and the housing
market did not crash. Nevertheless the international crisis of conﬁdence
transmitted to the Polish interbank market, reducing the volume of transac-
tions and raising spreads. This transmitted to spreads on commercial loans
and deposits. Moreover, survey evidence shows that banks drastically tigh-
tened lending standards raising i.a. collateral requirements (NBP, 2009). As
a result lending to households and enterprises broke down. Between 1q2008
and 2q2009 new loans to households decreased by a quarter and to enter-
prises by a third (Figure 2). Simulations based on our model show that
shocks generated by the Polish banking sector in late 2008 and early 2009
indeed deepened the economic slowdown. We ﬁnd that they contributed
1.5 percent to the GDP slowdown. Thus, the impact of the turmoil in the
banking sector was important but not overwhelming.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two presents the
model, section three the calibrating/ estimating procedure and section four
the results. Section ﬁve concludes.
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2 The Model
We model a heterogeneous agents small open economy with ﬁnancial fric-
tions. Our economy is populated by patient households, impatient house-
holds and entrepreneurs. Patient households consume, accumulate housing
stock, save, and work. Impatient households consume, accumulate housing
stock, borrow and work. Entrepreneurs produce homogeneous intermediate
goods using capital purchased form capital good producers and labour sup-
plied by households. Furthermore, entrepreneurs can borrow to ﬁnance ca-
pital purchases.
Both patient and impatient households supply their diﬀerentiated labour
services through labour unions which set their wages to maximise the mem-
bers’ utility. Labour is sold to a competitive intermediary who supplies
undiﬀerentiated labour services to entrepreneurs.
There are three stages of production. First, entrepreneurs produce homo-
geneous intermediate goods which are sold in perfectly competitive markets
to retailers. Next, retailers brand them at no cost and sell diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods in monopolistically competitive markets to aggregators.
Finally, aggregators aggregate domestic intermediate diﬀerentiated goods
and foreign diﬀerentiated goods into one ﬁnal domestic good.
There are also capital good and housing producers. Those producers use
ﬁnal consumption goods to produce capital or housing with a technology that
is subject to an investment adjustment cost. The adjustment cost allows for
price of capital and housing to diﬀer from the price of consumption goods.
In the ﬁnancial sector there are lending and saving banks as well as len-
ding and saving ﬁnancial intermediaries. A saving ﬁnancial intermediary
purchases diﬀerentiated deposits from saving banks and sells undiﬀerentia-
ted deposits to households (a convenient way is to think of a deposit or a
loan as a product). Similarly, the lending ﬁnancial intermediary purchases
diﬀerentiated loans from lending banks and sells undiﬀerentiated loans to
households or ﬁrms. In order to produce a deposit or a loan banks need to
purchase a deposit or a loan at the interbank market at the interbank in-
terest rate. There is also a central bank that controls the interbank interest
rate using open market operations and keeps it at the level set according to
a standard Taylor rule.
There are two types of frictions in the ﬁnancial sector. First the interest
rates on loans, savings and the interbank interest rate are diﬀerent. The dif-
ference is due to technological reasons and is subject to external shocks. This
is a convenient modelling device that allows to capture changes in interest
rate spreads which took place during the recent credit crunch. Second, bor-
rowers need collateral to take a loan either in the form of housing or capital.
The restrictiveness of this constraint is perturbed stochastically in the form
of shock to the required LTV ratios. Again, this is a convenient modelling
device that allows to introduce into a DSGE model the recent change in
loan granting policies in commercial banks. It should be noted that bothThe Model
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device that allows to introduce into a DSGE model the recent change in
loan granting policies in commercial banks. It should be noted that both
types of ﬁnancial disturbances enter our model exogenously. This reﬂects
the fact that ﬁnancial shocks that aﬀected Poland (as well as several other
small open economies) were primarily driven by external developments.
2.1 Households and Entrepreneurs
The economy is populated by impatient households, patient households, and
entrepreneurs of measure γI, γP, and γE, respectively (the measure of all
agents in the economy is one γI + γP + γE = 1). The important diﬀerence
between agents is the value of their discount factors. The discount factor
of patient households βP is higher than the discount factors of impatient
households βI. For simplicity we assume that entrepreneurs have the same
discount factor as impatient households βE = βI.
2.1.1 Patient Households
The patient household ι chooses consumption cP
t , the stock of housing χP
t
and deposits DH
t . The decision on the labour supply nP
t is not made by the
household but by a labour union, details of this decision are described later.

























where ξ denotes the degree of external habit formation and εu,t, εχ,t, εn,t are,
respectively, intertemporal, housing and labour preference shocks. These
shocks have an AR(1) representation with i.i.d. normal innovations2.
The patient household uses labour income WtnP
t , dividends3 ΠP
t and its
deposits from the previous period Dt−1 multiplied by the interest rate on
household deposits RH
D,t−1 to ﬁnance its consumption and housing expendi-





















t−1 (ι) − T (ι) + Π
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t (2)
where Pt and Pχ,t denote, respectively, the price of consumption good and
the price of housing, δχ is the depreciation rate of the housing stock and
T (ι) denotes taxes.
2The autoregressive coeﬃcients are ρu, ρχ, and ρn while the standard deviations are
σu, σχ, and σn, respectively.
3Patient households own all the ﬁrms in this economy.
4Lump sum taxes are paid by both patient and impatient households.
5The model is calibrated so that in the steady state and its neighbourhood patient
households do not borrow, thus borrowing is excluded from the budget constraint.
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2.1.2 Impatient Households
Impatient households diﬀerently from patient households are borrowers not
lenders in the neighbourhood of the steady state. A representative impatient
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t, the stock of housing χI and loans LH
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Similarly as for patient households, labour supply decision is taken by a
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t is households loan-to-value ratio which follows an AR(1) process
with i.i.d. normal innovations7.
2.1.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs draw utility only from their consumption cE
t , their utility
















In order to ﬁnance consumption they run ﬁrms producing homogeneous in-
termediate goods yW,t with the following technology
yW,t (ι) = At [ut (ι)kt−1 (ι)]
α nt (ι)
1−α (7)
where At is an exogenous AR(1) process for the total factor productivity8,
ut ∈ [0,∞) is the capital utilisation rate9, kt is the capital stock and nt is
the labour input. The capital utilisation rate can be changed but only at
a cost ψ (ut)kt−1 which is expressed in terms of consumption units and the
6Note that impatient households do not own any ﬁrms thus they do not receive any
dividends.
7The autoregressive coeﬃcient is ρmH and the standard deviation is σmH.
8The autoregressive coeﬃcient is ρA and the standard deviation is σA.
9ut is normalised, so that the deterministic steady state capacity utilisation rate is
equal to one.
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7The autoregressive coeﬃcient is ρmH and the standard deviation is σmH.
8The autoregressive coeﬃcient is ρA and the standard deviation is σA.
9ut is normalised, so that the deterministic steady state capacity utilisation rate is
equal to one.
2.1.2 Impatient Households
Impatient households diﬀerently from patient households are borrowers not
lenders in the neighbourhood of the steady state. A representative impatient
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t, the stock of housing χI and loans LH
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types of ﬁnancial disturbances enter our model exogenously. This reﬂects
the fact that ﬁnancial shocks that aﬀected Poland (as well as several other
small open economies) were primarily driven by external developments.
2.1 Households and Entrepreneurs
The economy is populated by impatient households, patient households, and
entrepreneurs of measure γI, γP, and γE, respectively (the measure of all
agents in the economy is one γI + γP + γE = 1). The important diﬀerence
between agents is the value of their discount factors. The discount factor
of patient households βP is higher than the discount factors of impatient
households βI. For simplicity we assume that entrepreneurs have the same
discount factor as impatient households βE = βI.
2.1.1 Patient Households
The patient household ι chooses consumption cP
t , the stock of housing χP
t
and deposits DH
t . The decision on the labour supply nP
t is not made by the
household but by a labour union, details of this decision are described later.

























where ξ denotes the degree of external habit formation and εu,t, εχ,t, εn,t are,
respectively, intertemporal, housing and labour preference shocks. These
shocks have an AR(1) representation with i.i.d. normal innovations2.
The patient household uses labour income WtnP
t , dividends3 ΠP
t and its
deposits from the previous period Dt−1 multiplied by the interest rate on
household deposits RH
D,t−1 to ﬁnance its consumption and housing expendi-





















t−1 (ι) − T (ι) + Π
P
t (2)
where Pt and Pχ,t denote, respectively, the price of consumption good and
the price of housing, δχ is the depreciation rate of the housing stock and
T (ι) denotes taxes.
2The autoregressive coeﬃcients are ρu, ρχ, and ρn while the standard deviations are
σu, σχ, and σn, respectively.
3Patient households own all the ﬁrms in this economy.
4Lump sum taxes are paid by both patient and impatient households.
5The model is calibrated so that in the steady state and its neighbourhood patient
households do not borrow, thus borrowing is excluded from the budget constraint.
function ψ (u) satisﬁes ψ (1) = 0, ψ (1) > 0 and ψ (1) > 0 (we assume no
capital utilisation adjustment cost in the deterministic steady state). It is





(1). In order to ﬁnance their expenditure on
consumption, labour services, capital accumulation, capital utilisation rate
adjustment cost and repayment of debt RF
L,t−1LF
t−1 they use the revenue from
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where Pk,t is the price of capital, PW,t is the price of the homogeneous inter-
mediate good and δk is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
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F
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where mF
t is ﬁrm’s loan-to-value ratio which follows an AR(1) process with
i.i.d. normal innovations10.
2.1.4 Labour Supply
We assume that each household has a continuum of labour types of measure
one, h ∈ [0,1]. Moreover, for each type h there is a labour union that sets
the wage for its labour type Wt (h) and each household belongs to all of
the labour unions (i.e. each union includes γP patients and γI impatiens).
Labour services are sold to perfectly competitive aggregators who pool all

































is the aggregate wage in the economy.
The union’s discount factor is the weighted average of those of its mem-






βI. The union sets the wage rate
according the the standard Calvo scheme, i.e. with probability (1 − θw) it
receives a signal to reoptimise and then sets its wage to maximise the utility
of its average member subject to the demand for its labour services and with
probability θw does not receive the signal and indexes its wage according to
10The autoregressive coeﬃcient is ρmF and the standard deviation is σmF.The Model
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the following rule
Wt+1 (h) = ((1 − ζw) ¯ π + ζwπt−1)Wt (h) (13)
where ¯ π is the steady state inﬂation rate and ζw ∈ [0,1].
2.2 Producers
There are three sectors in the economy: capital goods sector, housing sector
and consumption goods sector. In the capital goods sector and the housing
sector we have, respectively, capital goods producers and housing producers
which operate in perfectly competitive markets. In the consumption goods
sector we have the entrepreneurs described earlier, who sell their undiﬀeren-
tiated goods to retailers who brand those goods, thus diﬀerentiating them,
and sell them to aggregators at home and abroad. Aggregators combine
diﬀerentiated domestic intermediate goods and diﬀerentiated foreign inter-
mediate goods into a single ﬁnal good.
2.2.1 Capital Good Producers
Capital good producers operate in a perfectly competitive market and use
ﬁnal consumption goods to produce capital goods. In each period a capital
good producer buys ik,t of ﬁnal consumption goods and old undepreciated
capital (1 − δk)kt−1 from entrepreneurs. Next she transforms old undepre-
ciated capital one-to-one into new capital, while the transformation of the
ﬁnal goods is subject to adjustment cost Sk (ik,t/ik,t−1). We adopt the spe-
ciﬁcation of Christiano et al. (2005) and assume that in the deterministic
steady state there are no capital adjustment costs (Sk (1) = S

k (1) = 0), and
the function is concave in the neighbourhood of the deterministic steady
state (S

k (1) = 1/κk > 0). Thus the technology to produce new capital is
given by








The new capital is then sold to entrepreneurs and can be used in the next
period production process. The real price of capital is denoted as pk,t =
Pk,t/Pt.
2.2.2 Housing Producers
Housing producers act in a similar fashion as the capital good producers.
The stock of new housing follows








where the function describing adjustment cost Sχ (iχ,t/iχ,t−1) satisﬁes Sχ (1) =
S

χ (1) = 0 and S
χ (1) = 1/κχ > 0. The real price of capital is denoted as
pχ,t = Pχ,t/Pt.The Model
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2.2.3 Final Good Producers
Final good producers play the role of aggregators. They buy diﬀerentiated
product from domestic retailers yH,t (jH) and importing retailers yF,t (jF)
and aggregate them into a single ﬁnal good, which they sell in a perfectly


































and η is the home bias parameter. The problem of the aggregator gives the














































There is a continuum of domestic retailers of measure one denoted by jH.
They purchase undiﬀerentiated intermediate goods from entrepreneurs, brand
them, thus transforming them into diﬀerentiated goods, and sell them to ag-
gregators. They act in a monopolistically competitive environment and set
their prices according to the standard Calvo scheme. In each period each
domestic retailer receives with probability (1 − θH) a signal to reoptimise
and then sets her price to maximise the expected proﬁts or does not receiveThe Model
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There is a continuum of domestic retailers of measure one denoted by jH.
They purchase undiﬀerentiated intermediate goods from entrepreneurs, brand
them, thus transforming them into diﬀerentiated goods, and sell them to ag-
gregators. They act in a monopolistically competitive environment and set
their prices according to the standard Calvo scheme. In each period each
domestic retailer receives with probability (1 − θH) a signal to reoptimise
and then sets her price to maximise the expected proﬁts or does not receive
the signal and then indexes her price according to the following rule
PH,t+1 (jH) = PH,t (jH)((1 − ζH) ¯ π + ζHπt−1) (25)
where ζH ∈ [0,1].
2.2.5 Importing Retailers
Again there is a continuum of importing retailers of measure one denoted
by jF. Similarly as the domestic retailers, they purchase undiﬀerentiated
goods abroad and brand them, thus transforming them into diﬀerentiated
goods, and sell them to aggregators. They operate in a monopolistically com-
petitive environment and set their prices according to the standard Calvo
scheme. We assume that prices are sticky in domestic currency, which is
consistent with incomplete pass through. Prices are reoptimised with pro-
bability (1 − θF) and with probability θF prices are indexed according to the
following rule
PF,t+1 (jF) = PF,t (jF)((1 − ζF) ¯ π + ζFπt−1) (26)
where ζF ∈ [0,1].
2.2.6 Exporting Retailers
There is a continuum of exporting retailers of measure one, denoted by j∗
H.
Retailers purchase domestic undiﬀerentiated goods, brand them and sell
them abroad for a price P ∗
H,t (j∗
H), which is expressed in terms of foreign
currency. We assume that prices are sticky in the foreign currency. The
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Additionally, we assume that foreign demand, the interest rate and inﬂation
follow a VAR(1) process.
Exporting retailers reoptimise their prices with probability (1 − θ∗
H) or
























2.3 The Financial Sector
Similarly as in the case of the goods producers, banking activity is divided
into several steps. First, saving banks purchase deposit accounts (deposit
account is a product, which is sold and bought) in the interbank market,
next they brand them and sell to a ﬁnancial saving intermediary. The ﬁnan-
cial saving intermediary purchases diﬀerentiated saving accounts aggregates
them and sells them as an undiﬀerentiated saving account to households.
Similarly, credit banks take undiﬀerentiated loans in the interbank market,
brand them and sell them to a ﬁnancial lending intermediary. The ﬁnancial
lending intermediary aggregates all diﬀerentiated loans into a single loan
that is oﬀered to either households or ﬁrms. In the loan production there is
specialisation and we have two parallel branches one that produces loans for
households an the other for ﬁrms (entrepreneurs).
In our model ﬁnancial sector disturbances are completely exogenous. We
believe that this way of introducing them into the model is justiﬁed from
the point of view of our question. We are not investigating the potential
sources of the recent credit crunch, but merely check the importance of
ﬁnancial sector disturbances to the recent credit crunch in Poland. As it
was argued in the introduction, the crunch in Poland was driven by external
developments and Polish ﬁnancial institutions were in good shape on the
onset of the crisis. Given these factors, we believe that modelling ﬁnancial
sector disturbances as exogenous shocks is justiﬁed.
2.3.1 Financial Intermediaries
The ﬁnancial savings intermediary collects deposits from households and
deposits them in saving banks. In order to understand the problem of the
intermediary it is convenient to think about the deposit as a product with
a price 1/RD, where RD is the interest rate on a given deposit. Thus the
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Saving intermediaries operate in a competitive environment and take the

























There are two types of lending intermediaries, one that oﬀers loans to
households and one that oﬀers loans to ﬁrms (entrepreneurs). There is one
important diﬀerence between the lending and saving intermediaries: for the
lending intermediary the price of credit is the interest rate, not its inverse
as in case of the saving intermediary. Next, we describe the behaviour of
the lending intermediary for households. Since, the behaviour of the lending
intermediary for ﬁrms is identical, one needs just to replace superscript H
with F. Intermediaries for households oﬀer loans LH
t to households at the
interest rate RH
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that is oﬀered to either households or ﬁrms. In the loan production there is
specialisation and we have two parallel branches one that produces loans for
households an the other for ﬁrms (entrepreneurs).
In our model ﬁnancial sector disturbances are completely exogenous. We
believe that this way of introducing them into the model is justiﬁed from
the point of view of our question. We are not investigating the potential
sources of the recent credit crunch, but merely check the importance of
ﬁnancial sector disturbances to the recent credit crunch in Poland. As it
was argued in the introduction, the crunch in Poland was driven by external
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onset of the crisis. Given these factors, we believe that modelling ﬁnancial
sector disturbances as exogenous shocks is justiﬁed.
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deposits them in saving banks. In order to understand the problem of the
intermediary it is convenient to think about the deposit as a product with
a price 1/RD, where RD is the interest rate on a given deposit. Thus the
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Saving intermediaries operate in a competitive environment and take the

























There are two types of lending intermediaries, one that oﬀers loans to
households and one that oﬀers loans to ﬁrms (entrepreneurs). There is one
important diﬀerence between the lending and saving intermediaries: for the
lending intermediary the price of credit is the interest rate, not its inverse
as in case of the saving intermediary. Next, we describe the behaviour of
the lending intermediary for households. Since, the behaviour of the lending
intermediary for ﬁrms is identical, one needs just to replace superscript H
with F. Intermediaries for households oﬀer loans LH
t to households at the
interest rate RH
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at the policy rate Rt. In order to introduce time varying spreads
we assume that for each unit of deposits collected the bank can deposit at the
interbank market zH
D,t units of deposit, where zH
D,t follows an AR(1) process




















The bank operates in a monopolistically competitive environment with the
demand function given by (36). We assume that the bank sets its interest
rates according to the Calvo scheme, i.e. with probability (1 − θD) it receives
a signal and reoptimises its interest rate and with probability θD it does not
change the interest rate. Once the the bank receives the signal to reoptimise









































discount factor taken from the problem of patient households (who own the
bank) between period t and t + s + 1. Moreover, we put the ” + 1” term
because the payments on the deposits are made one period after the deposit
is collected.
2.3.3 Lending Banks
There are two types of lending banks both of measure one, one that lends to
households iH
L and one that lends to ﬁrms iF
L. Here we describe the problem
of the former, the problem of the latter is identical (it is enough to replace
the superscript H with F in the formulas). The lending bank iH
L takes loans
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can be made, where zH





















The bank operates in a monopolistically competitive market with the de-
mand function given by (37). Moreover, we assume that the interest rates
are set according to the Calvo scheme. Thus, the bank receives a signal to
reoptimise its interest rate with probability (1 − θL). If the bank receives a





































subject to the deposits demand (37) and (44), otherwise it does not change




t,t+s+1 is taken from the patient household’s problem.
Note that since the interbank interest rate is set by the central bank
according to a Taylor rule (as described in section 2.5) the interbank market
is cleared by the central bank through open market operations. Thus there
is no market clearing condition in this market (it is replaced by a Taylor
rule).
Since our economy is open banks have also access to the foreign interbank
market subject to a risk premium ρt that is a function of the foreign debt to









where et denotes the nominal exchange rate, L∗
t foreign debt, ˜ yt GDP and ερ,t
are i.i.d. normal innovations (the standard deviation is σρ). This gives rise to
the standard uncovered interest parity condition (UIP) which in loglinearised
version is presented in equation (A.34).
2.4 The Government
The government uses lump sum taxes to ﬁnance government expenditure.







where gt denotes government expenditure. For simplicity we assume that
the government budget is balanced. Moreover, we assume that government
expenditures are driven by a simple autoregressive process
12The autoregressive coeﬃcient is ρzH
L and the standard deviation is σzH
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gt = ρgµg + (1 − ρg)gt−1 + εg,t. (48)
with i.i.d. normal innovations (the standard deviation is σg) and ρg ∈ (0,1).
2.5 The Central Bank
As it is common in the new Keynesian literature, we assume that monetary
policy is conducted according to a Taylor rule that targets deviations from















where ˜ y denotes GDP, πt = Pt
Pt−1, and ϕt are i.i.d. normal innovations (the
standard deviation is σR). It’s worth noting that the Taylor rule plays a key
role in bringing stability to the model and determining the reaction of the
model economy to exogenous shocks13.
2.6 Market Clearing, Balance of Payments and GDP
To close the model we need the market clearing conditions for the ﬁnal and
intermediate goods markets and the housing market as well as the balance
of payments and the GDP equations. In the ﬁnal goods market we have












Next, the market clearing condition in the intermediate homogeneous goods







H,t(j)dj = yW,t (52)







t = χt−1 (53)
The balance of payments (in home currency) has the following form
 1
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13For discussion see Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005).
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GDP is deﬁned as follows
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3 Calibration and Estimation
3.1 Calibration Procedure
Conforming to the practise of bringing DSGE models to the data (Smets
and Wouters, 2003; Adolfson et al., 2005) we partly calibrate and partly
estimate the parameters. The calibrated parameters are mainly steady state
ratios, that can be relatively easily found in the data and parameters that
have been well established in the literature and which have previously been
found to be weakly identiﬁed in the data. Where it applies, parameters are
presented as quarterly numbers.
Table 1: Selected calibrated parameters of the model
Parameter βP βI δk δχ µ µw η α
Value 0.995 0.975 0.025 0.0125 1 0.1 0.6 0.3
We calibrate the rate of time preference for patient consumers to βP =
0.995 to match the annual real rate on deposits of 2%. The rate of time
preference for impatient consumers and entrepreneurs is set to βI = βE =
0.975 to make sure that the lending constraint is binding in the steady state.
Depreciation rates of capital and housing are set to δk = 0.025 and δχ =
0.0125 respectively. The steady state loan to value ratios are calibrated to the
long-term averages coming respectively from bank surveys (household LTV)
and corporate reports (enterprise LTV), so that ¯ mH = 0.7 and ¯ mF = 0.2.
The inﬂation targets of the NBP and ECB have been set to 0.00625 and 0.005
implying annual inﬂation rates of 2.5% and 2% respectively. The elasticity
of production with respect to capital is set to α = 0.3, consistent with
most of the DSGE literature. Further, we assume the following measures for
patient and impatient households and entrepreneurs, γP = 0.5, γI = 0.25
and γE = 0.25 . The parameter µ is set to 1, so that the Armington elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods equals
1+µ
µ = 2 (Ruhl,
2005), and the home bias parameter is set to η = 0.6 consistent with the
exports to absorption ratio in Poland in the recent years. The parameter µw
in the labour aggregator was set to 0.1 implying a steady state markup over
wages of 10%.
The steady state loan to GDP ratios are set to
¯ lH
¯ ˜ y = .05 and
¯ lF
¯ ˜ y = .06,
reﬂecting the GDP ratio of new household and enterprise loans granted du-
ring a quarter. It should be noted that this is much less than the stock
of outstanding loans, but in our view this reﬂects better the notion of ﬂow
of credit embedded in the model. Due to the disinﬂation process in Po-
land steady state interest rate levels are set according to average values in
the period of stable inﬂation. The steady state exports, imports, consump-
tion, investment, housing investment and foreign debt to GDP ratios were
calibrated for Poland consistent with long-term averages. The remaining
calibrated parameters are derived from from steady state relationships. TheCalibration and Estimation
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Table 2: Selected steady state ratios of the model
Variable∗ Values
Consumption share in absorption 0.60
Investment share in absorption 0.15
Housing investment share in GDP 0.05
Absorption to GDP 1.03
Export share in GDP 0.27
Import share in GDP 0.3
LTV on loans to households 0.7
LTV on loans to ﬁrms 0.2
New loans to households to GDP ratio 0.05
New loans to ﬁrms to GDP ratio 0.06
External debt to GDP ratio 2
Inﬂation 0.62%
Policy interest rate 1.23%
Interest rate on loans to households 2.57%
Interest rate on loans to ﬁrms 1.71%
∗Interest rates, inﬂation and GDP are expressed quarterly terms.
most important calibrated parameters and the steady state ratios have been
collected in Tables 1 and 2.
3.2 Data and Estimation
We ﬁt the model to the data using fourteen macroeconomic time series.
These cover the period 1q1997-2q2009 giving T = 50 quarterly observations.
Ten time series cover the Polish economy, these are real GDP, real govern-
ment expenditure, real exchange rate, consumer price inﬂation (HICP), mo-
ney market interest rate (WIBOR3M), spreads between the money market
rate and household deposit, household credit and enterprise credit interest
rates and real new loans to households and enterprises. Three time series
cover the euro area: real GDP, HICP inﬂation and the money market rate
(EURIBOR3M). National account variables have been taken in logs, sea-
sonally adjusted and detrended using the HP ﬁlter. Inﬂation rates were
seasonally adjusted. Due to the disinﬂation process Polish data on inﬂation
and the interest rate were also detrended. All data comes from the Eurostat
database, except for loans which come from the NBP.
The model has been estimated using Bayesian estimators. Such approach
allows for providing additional information via prior distributions, something
important and common in DSGE model estimation. While choosing para-
meters of the prior distribution we relied on the existing DSGE literature,
in particular its applications for Poland (Smets and Wouters, 2003; Kolasa,
2009; Gradzewicz and Makarski, 2009; Grabek et al., 2007). We assumed
that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for housing is probably hi-
gher than for consumption and set their prior mean values to 4 and 2 respec-
tively. As it is common in the literature (Smets and Wouters, 2003; Adolfson
et al., 2005) prior means of all Calvo probability parameters were set to 0.6,
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that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for housing is probably hi-
gher than for consumption and set their prior mean values to 4 and 2 respec-
tively. As it is common in the literature (Smets and Wouters, 2003; Adolfson
et al., 2005) prior means of all Calvo probability parameters were set to 0.6,Calibration and Estimation
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Table 3: Prior and posterior distribution: structural parameters
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
type Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean St. Dev.
ξ beta 0.50 0.10 0.42 0.44 0.08
σχ norm 4.00 0.50 4.07 4.05 0.49
σc norm 2.00 0.10 1.96 2.02 0.41
σn norm 4.00 0.50 3.74 3.80 0.50
κk beta 0.20 0.05 0.19 0.20 0.05
κχ beta 0.02 0.005 0.02 0.02 0.005
ψ gamm 0.20 0.05 0.19 0.21 0.05
θW beta 0.60 0.10 0.75 0.75 0.08
θH beta 0.60 0.10 0.45 0.45 0.06
θF beta 0.60 0.10 0.83 0.83 0.04
θD beta 0.60 0.10 0.55 0.55 0.05
θL beta 0.60 0.10 0.53 0.54 0.03
θ∗
H beta 0.60 0.10 0.85 0.85 0.04
ζw beta 0.50 0.10 0.44 0.45 0.10
ζH beta 0.50 0.10 0.42 0.43 0.10
ζF beta 0.50 0.10 0.44 0.45 0.10
ζ∗
H beta 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.50 0.11
φR beta 0.70 0.10 0.81 0.84 0.02
φπ norm 1.50 0.10 1.55 1.50 0.10
φy norm 0.50 0.05 0.48 0.52 0.05
of indexation rates to 0.5 and of autocorrelation of shocks to 0.7. Prior
means for the monetary policy rule were set at standard (Taylor, 1993) va-
lues. Priors for standard deviations of the above parameters were mainly set
to 0.1 as is common in the literature (Christoﬀel et al., 2008; Adolfson et al.,
2005). In three cases the prior distributions had to be tightened, since the
posterior estimates diverged substantially from our prior knowledge. First,
the estimate of φy was consistently close to zero, which in our view reﬂected
the fact that our sample contained a long period of disinﬂation where the
central bank payed relatively less attention to output performance than un-
der current inﬂation targeting policy. Second, the estimates of ρmH and ρmF
were estimated above 0.9, which was inconsistent with the data from Senior
Loan Oﬃcer Surveys (NBP, 2009).
Regarding shock processes, the prior means of standard deviations for
euro area shocks were set to 0.01 (Smets and Wouters, 2003). Regarding
standard deviations of domestic shocks, we also set them to 0.05 or to 0.01.
As it is shown in Kolasa (2009) the Polish economy is more volatile than the
Euro economy, thus the standard deviations of shocks must be higher. A
notable exception are shocks to LTV’s, whose prior standard deviations are
higher which and reﬂects the high variance of the loan data. Finally, we allo-
wed for the euro area shocks to be correlated, reﬂecting their non-structural
nature. The mean of the correlation coeﬃcients has been agnostically set to
zero.
The estimation was performed as follows. First, the modes of the pos-
Table 2: Selected steady state ratios of the model
Variable∗ Values
Consumption share in absorption 0.60
Investment share in absorption 0.15
Housing investment share in GDP 0.05
Absorption to GDP 1.03
Export share in GDP 0.27
Import share in GDP 0.3
LTV on loans to households 0.7
LTV on loans to ﬁrms 0.2
New loans to households to GDP ratio 0.05
New loans to ﬁrms to GDP ratio 0.06
External debt to GDP ratio 2
Inﬂation 0.62%
Policy interest rate 1.23%
Interest rate on loans to households 2.57%
Interest rate on loans to ﬁrms 1.71%
∗Interest rates, inﬂation and GDP are expressed quarterly terms.
most important calibrated parameters and the steady state ratios have been
collected in Tables 1 and 2.
3.2 Data and Estimation
We ﬁt the model to the data using fourteen macroeconomic time series.
These cover the period 1q1997-2q2009 giving T = 50 quarterly observations.
Ten time series cover the Polish economy, these are real GDP, real govern-
ment expenditure, real exchange rate, consumer price inﬂation (HICP), mo-
ney market interest rate (WIBOR3M), spreads between the money market
rate and household deposit, household credit and enterprise credit interest
rates and real new loans to households and enterprises. Three time series
cover the euro area: real GDP, HICP inﬂation and the money market rate
(EURIBOR3M). National account variables have been taken in logs, sea-
sonally adjusted and detrended using the HP ﬁlter. Inﬂation rates were
seasonally adjusted. Due to the disinﬂation process Polish data on inﬂation
and the interest rate were also detrended. All data comes from the Eurostat
database, except for loans which come from the NBP.
The model has been estimated using Bayesian estimators. Such approach
allows for providing additional information via prior distributions, something
important and common in DSGE model estimation. While choosing para-
meters of the prior distribution we relied on the existing DSGE literature,
in particular its applications for Poland (Smets and Wouters, 2003; Kolasa,
2009; Gradzewicz and Makarski, 2009; Grabek et al., 2007). We assumed
that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for housing is probably hi-
gher than for consumption and set their prior mean values to 4 and 2 respec-
tively. As it is common in the literature (Smets and Wouters, 2003; Adolfson
et al., 2005) prior means of all Calvo probability parameters were set to 0.6,
Table 3: Prior and posterior distribution: structural parameters
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
type Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean St. Dev.
ξ beta 0.50 0.10 0.42 0.44 0.08
σχ norm 4.00 0.50 4.07 4.05 0.49
σc norm 2.00 0.10 1.96 2.02 0.41
σn norm 4.00 0.50 3.74 3.80 0.50
κk beta 0.20 0.05 0.19 0.20 0.05
κχ beta 0.02 0.005 0.02 0.02 0.005
ψ gamm 0.20 0.05 0.19 0.21 0.05
θW beta 0.60 0.10 0.75 0.75 0.08
θH beta 0.60 0.10 0.45 0.45 0.06
θF beta 0.60 0.10 0.83 0.83 0.04
θD beta 0.60 0.10 0.55 0.55 0.05
θL beta 0.60 0.10 0.53 0.54 0.03
θ∗
H beta 0.60 0.10 0.85 0.85 0.04
ζw beta 0.50 0.10 0.44 0.45 0.10
ζH beta 0.50 0.10 0.42 0.43 0.10
ζF beta 0.50 0.10 0.44 0.45 0.10
ζ∗
H beta 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.50 0.11
φR beta 0.70 0.10 0.81 0.84 0.02
φπ norm 1.50 0.10 1.55 1.50 0.10
φy norm 0.50 0.05 0.48 0.52 0.05
of indexation rates to 0.5 and of autocorrelation of shocks to 0.7. Prior
means for the monetary policy rule were set at standard (Taylor, 1993) va-
lues. Priors for standard deviations of the above parameters were mainly set
to 0.1 as is common in the literature (Christoﬀel et al., 2008; Adolfson et al.,
2005). In three cases the prior distributions had to be tightened, since the
posterior estimates diverged substantially from our prior knowledge. First,
the estimate of φy was consistently close to zero, which in our view reﬂected
the fact that our sample contained a long period of disinﬂation where the
central bank payed relatively less attention to output performance than un-
der current inﬂation targeting policy. Second, the estimates of ρmH and ρmF
were estimated above 0.9, which was inconsistent with the data from Senior
Loan Oﬃcer Surveys (NBP, 2009).
Regarding shock processes, the prior means of standard deviations for
euro area shocks were set to 0.01 (Smets and Wouters, 2003). Regarding
standard deviations of domestic shocks, we also set them to 0.05 or to 0.01.
As it is shown in Kolasa (2009) the Polish economy is more volatile than the
Euro economy, thus the standard deviations of shocks must be higher. A
notable exception are shocks to LTV’s, whose prior standard deviations are
higher which and reﬂects the high variance of the loan data. Finally, we allo-
wed for the euro area shocks to be correlated, reﬂecting their non-structural
nature. The mean of the correlation coeﬃcients has been agnostically set to
zero.
The estimation was performed as follows. First, the modes of the pos-
Table 2: Selected steady state ratios of the model
Variable∗ Values
Consumption share in absorption 0.60
Investment share in absorption 0.15
Housing investment share in GDP 0.05
Absorption to GDP 1.03
Export share in GDP 0.27
Import share in GDP 0.3
LTV on loans to households 0.7
LTV on loans to ﬁrms 0.2
New loans to households to GDP ratio 0.05
New loans to ﬁrms to GDP ratio 0.06
External debt to GDP ratio 2
Inﬂation 0.62%
Policy interest rate 1.23%
Interest rate on loans to households 2.57%
Interest rate on loans to ﬁrms 1.71%
∗Interest rates, inﬂation and GDP are expressed quarterly terms.
most important calibrated parameters and the steady state ratios have been
collected in Tables 1 and 2.
3.2 Data and Estimation
We ﬁt the model to the data using fourteen macroeconomic time series.
These cover the period 1q1997-2q2009 giving T = 50 quarterly observations.
Ten time series cover the Polish economy, these are real GDP, real govern-
ment expenditure, real exchange rate, consumer price inﬂation (HICP), mo-
ney market interest rate (WIBOR3M), spreads between the money market
rate and household deposit, household credit and enterprise credit interest
rates and real new loans to households and enterprises. Three time series
cover the euro area: real GDP, HICP inﬂation and the money market rate
(EURIBOR3M). National account variables have been taken in logs, sea-
sonally adjusted and detrended using the HP ﬁlter. Inﬂation rates were
seasonally adjusted. Due to the disinﬂation process Polish data on inﬂation
and the interest rate were also detrended. All data comes from the Eurostat
database, except for loans which come from the NBP.
The model has been estimated using Bayesian estimators. Such approach
allows for providing additional information via prior distributions, something
important and common in DSGE model estimation. While choosing para-
meters of the prior distribution we relied on the existing DSGE literature,
in particular its applications for Poland (Smets and Wouters, 2003; Kolasa,
2009; Gradzewicz and Makarski, 2009; Grabek et al., 2007). We assumed
that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for housing is probably hi-
gher than for consumption and set their prior mean values to 4 and 2 respec-
tively. As it is common in the literature (Smets and Wouters, 2003; Adolfson
et al., 2005) prior means of all Calvo probability parameters were set to 0.6,Calibration and Estimation
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Table 3: Prior and posterior distribution: structural parameters
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
type Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean St. Dev.
ξ beta 0.50 0.10 0.42 0.44 0.08
σχ norm 4.00 0.50 4.07 4.05 0.49
σc norm 2.00 0.10 1.96 2.02 0.41
σn norm 4.00 0.50 3.74 3.80 0.50
κk beta 0.20 0.05 0.19 0.20 0.05
κχ beta 0.02 0.005 0.02 0.02 0.005
ψ gamm 0.20 0.05 0.19 0.21 0.05
θW beta 0.60 0.10 0.75 0.75 0.08
θH beta 0.60 0.10 0.45 0.45 0.06
θF beta 0.60 0.10 0.83 0.83 0.04
θD beta 0.60 0.10 0.55 0.55 0.05
θL beta 0.60 0.10 0.53 0.54 0.03
θ∗
H beta 0.60 0.10 0.85 0.85 0.04
ζw beta 0.50 0.10 0.44 0.45 0.10
ζH beta 0.50 0.10 0.42 0.43 0.10
ζF beta 0.50 0.10 0.44 0.45 0.10
ζ∗
H beta 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.50 0.11
φR beta 0.70 0.10 0.81 0.84 0.02
φπ norm 1.50 0.10 1.55 1.50 0.10
φy norm 0.50 0.05 0.48 0.52 0.05
of indexation rates to 0.5 and of autocorrelation of shocks to 0.7. Prior
means for the monetary policy rule were set at standard (Taylor, 1993) va-
lues. Priors for standard deviations of the above parameters were mainly set
to 0.1 as is common in the literature (Christoﬀel et al., 2008; Adolfson et al.,
2005). In three cases the prior distributions had to be tightened, since the
posterior estimates diverged substantially from our prior knowledge. First,
the estimate of φy was consistently close to zero, which in our view reﬂected
the fact that our sample contained a long period of disinﬂation where the
central bank payed relatively less attention to output performance than un-
der current inﬂation targeting policy. Second, the estimates of ρmH and ρmF
were estimated above 0.9, which was inconsistent with the data from Senior
Loan Oﬃcer Surveys (NBP, 2009).
Regarding shock processes, the prior means of standard deviations for
euro area shocks were set to 0.01 (Smets and Wouters, 2003). Regarding
standard deviations of domestic shocks, we also set them to 0.05 or to 0.01.
As it is shown in Kolasa (2009) the Polish economy is more volatile than the
Euro economy, thus the standard deviations of shocks must be higher. A
notable exception are shocks to LTV’s, whose prior standard deviations are
higher which and reﬂects the high variance of the loan data. Finally, we allo-
wed for the euro area shocks to be correlated, reﬂecting their non-structural
nature. The mean of the correlation coeﬃcients has been agnostically set to
zero.
The estimation was performed as follows. First, the modes of the pos-
Table 4: Prior and posterior distribution: shocks
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
type Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean St. Dev.
ρu beta 0.70 0.10 0.78 0.76 0.06
ρχ beta 0.70 0.10 0.72 0.70 0.11
ρn beta 0.70 0.10 0.72 0.70 0.11
ρA beta 0.70 0.10 0.60 0.60 0.09
ρρ beta 0.70 0.10 0.70 0.68 0.06
ρg beta 0.70 0.10 0.62 0.62 0.09
ρmH beta 0.70 0.05 0.73 0.72 0.05
ρmF beta 0.70 0.05 0.75 0.74 0.04
ρzH
D beta 0.70 0.10 0.63 0.63 0.08
ρzH
L beta 0.70 0.10 0.70 0.68 0.08
ρzF
L beta 0.70 0.10 0.55 0.55 0.09
σu invg 0.05 Inf 0.127 0.142 0.033
σχ invg 0.05 Inf 0.023 0.078 0.009
σn invg 0.05 Inf 0.023 0.052 0.009
σA invg 0.05 Inf 0.015 0.016 0.003
σρ invg 0.05 Inf 0.015 0.016 0.003
σR invg 0.01 Inf 0.002 0.002 0.000
σg invg 0.01 Inf 0.007 0.008 0.001
σmH invg 0.10 Inf 0.075 0.076 0.008
σmF invg 0.10 Inf 0.101 0.105 0.010
σzH
D invg 0.01 Inf 0.004 0.004 0.001
σzH
L invg 0.01 Inf 0.003 0.005 0.001
σzF
L invg 0.01 Inf 0.003 0.003 0.001
terior distributions have been found using Cris Sim’s csminwel procedure.
Next we applied the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with ﬁve blocks each
of 200.000 replications to approximate the complete posterior distribution.
Since the average acceptance rates amounted to 24-26% and diagnostic tests
of Brooks and Gelman (1998) conﬁrmed convergence of the Markov chains,
we used the second half of the draws to calculate posterior distributions.
These, together with the assumptions about the priors have been collected
in Tables 3 and 4.
As usually found in the literature (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003; Gra-
bek et al., 2007) we ﬁnd some persistence of shocks with autocorrelation
coeﬃcients ranging from 0.55 to 0.76. Regarding nominal rigidities we ﬁnd
relatively more wage than price stickiness, and very low indexation parame-
ters. The estimated stickiness in retail interest rates is non-negligible and
is similar for loans and deposits. The mean value of the Calvo parameter
of 0.5 implies an average period of 2 quarters between interest rate adjust-
ments. This is lower than for wages and prices and is probably related to
the fact that many interest rates are automatically indexed to the money
market rate in Poland. From the Taylor rule only the coeﬃcient of inertia is
clearly identiﬁed in the data while the remaining parameters are estimated
very close to their prior values.
Table 3: Prior and posterior distribution: structural parameters
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
type Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean St. Dev.
ξ beta 0.50 0.10 0.42 0.44 0.08
σχ norm 4.00 0.50 4.07 4.05 0.49
σc norm 2.00 0.10 1.96 2.02 0.41
σn norm 4.00 0.50 3.74 3.80 0.50
κk beta 0.20 0.05 0.19 0.20 0.05
κχ beta 0.02 0.005 0.02 0.02 0.005
ψ gamm 0.20 0.05 0.19 0.21 0.05
θW beta 0.60 0.10 0.75 0.75 0.08
θH beta 0.60 0.10 0.45 0.45 0.06
θF beta 0.60 0.10 0.83 0.83 0.04
θD beta 0.60 0.10 0.55 0.55 0.05
θL beta 0.60 0.10 0.53 0.54 0.03
θ∗
H beta 0.60 0.10 0.85 0.85 0.04
ζw beta 0.50 0.10 0.44 0.45 0.10
ζH beta 0.50 0.10 0.42 0.43 0.10
ζF beta 0.50 0.10 0.44 0.45 0.10
ζ∗
H beta 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.50 0.11
φR beta 0.70 0.10 0.81 0.84 0.02
φπ norm 1.50 0.10 1.55 1.50 0.10
φy norm 0.50 0.05 0.48 0.52 0.05
of indexation rates to 0.5 and of autocorrelation of shocks to 0.7. Prior
means for the monetary policy rule were set at standard (Taylor, 1993) va-
lues. Priors for standard deviations of the above parameters were mainly set
to 0.1 as is common in the literature (Christoﬀel et al., 2008; Adolfson et al.,
2005). In three cases the prior distributions had to be tightened, since the
posterior estimates diverged substantially from our prior knowledge. First,
the estimate of φy was consistently close to zero, which in our view reﬂected
the fact that our sample contained a long period of disinﬂation where the
central bank payed relatively less attention to output performance than un-
der current inﬂation targeting policy. Second, the estimates of ρmH and ρmF
were estimated above 0.9, which was inconsistent with the data from Senior
Loan Oﬃcer Surveys (NBP, 2009).
Regarding shock processes, the prior means of standard deviations for
euro area shocks were set to 0.01 (Smets and Wouters, 2003). Regarding
standard deviations of domestic shocks, we also set them to 0.05 or to 0.01.
As it is shown in Kolasa (2009) the Polish economy is more volatile than the
Euro economy, thus the standard deviations of shocks must be higher. A
notable exception are shocks to LTV’s, whose prior standard deviations are
higher which and reﬂects the high variance of the loan data. Finally, we allo-
wed for the euro area shocks to be correlated, reﬂecting their non-structural
nature. The mean of the correlation coeﬃcients has been agnostically set to
zero.
The estimation was performed as follows. First, the modes of the pos-Calibration and Estimation
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Table 4: Prior and posterior distribution: shocks
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
type Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean St. Dev.
ρu beta 0.70 0.10 0.78 0.76 0.06
ρχ beta 0.70 0.10 0.72 0.70 0.11
ρn beta 0.70 0.10 0.72 0.70 0.11
ρA beta 0.70 0.10 0.60 0.60 0.09
ρρ beta 0.70 0.10 0.70 0.68 0.06
ρg beta 0.70 0.10 0.62 0.62 0.09
ρmH beta 0.70 0.05 0.73 0.72 0.05
ρmF beta 0.70 0.05 0.75 0.74 0.04
ρzH
D beta 0.70 0.10 0.63 0.63 0.08
ρzH
L beta 0.70 0.10 0.70 0.68 0.08
ρzF
L beta 0.70 0.10 0.55 0.55 0.09
σu invg 0.05 Inf 0.127 0.142 0.033
σχ invg 0.05 Inf 0.023 0.078 0.009
σn invg 0.05 Inf 0.023 0.052 0.009
σA invg 0.05 Inf 0.015 0.016 0.003
σρ invg 0.05 Inf 0.015 0.016 0.003
σR invg 0.01 Inf 0.002 0.002 0.000
σg invg 0.01 Inf 0.007 0.008 0.001
σmH invg 0.10 Inf 0.075 0.076 0.008
σmF invg 0.10 Inf 0.101 0.105 0.010
σzH
D invg 0.01 Inf 0.004 0.004 0.001
σzH
L invg 0.01 Inf 0.003 0.005 0.001
σzF
L invg 0.01 Inf 0.003 0.003 0.001
terior distributions have been found using Cris Sim’s csminwel procedure.
Next we applied the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with ﬁve blocks each
of 200.000 replications to approximate the complete posterior distribution.
Since the average acceptance rates amounted to 24-26% and diagnostic tests
of Brooks and Gelman (1998) conﬁrmed convergence of the Markov chains,
we used the second half of the draws to calculate posterior distributions.
These, together with the assumptions about the priors have been collected
in Tables 3 and 4.
As usually found in the literature (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003; Gra-
bek et al., 2007) we ﬁnd some persistence of shocks with autocorrelation
coeﬃcients ranging from 0.55 to 0.76. Regarding nominal rigidities we ﬁnd
relatively more wage than price stickiness, and very low indexation parame-
ters. The estimated stickiness in retail interest rates is non-negligible and
is similar for loans and deposits. The mean value of the Calvo parameter
of 0.5 implies an average period of 2 quarters between interest rate adjust-
ments. This is lower than for wages and prices and is probably related to
the fact that many interest rates are automatically indexed to the money
market rate in Poland. From the Taylor rule only the coeﬃcient of inertia is
clearly identiﬁed in the data while the remaining parameters are estimated
very close to their prior values.
Table 3: Prior and posterior distribution: structural parameters
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
type Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean St. Dev.
ξ beta 0.50 0.10 0.42 0.44 0.08
σχ norm 4.00 0.50 4.07 4.05 0.49
σc norm 2.00 0.10 1.96 2.02 0.41
σn norm 4.00 0.50 3.74 3.80 0.50
κk beta 0.20 0.05 0.19 0.20 0.05
κχ beta 0.02 0.005 0.02 0.02 0.005
ψ gamm 0.20 0.05 0.19 0.21 0.05
θW beta 0.60 0.10 0.75 0.75 0.08
θH beta 0.60 0.10 0.45 0.45 0.06
θF beta 0.60 0.10 0.83 0.83 0.04
θD beta 0.60 0.10 0.55 0.55 0.05
θL beta 0.60 0.10 0.53 0.54 0.03
θ∗
H beta 0.60 0.10 0.85 0.85 0.04
ζw beta 0.50 0.10 0.44 0.45 0.10
ζH beta 0.50 0.10 0.42 0.43 0.10
ζF beta 0.50 0.10 0.44 0.45 0.10
ζ∗
H beta 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.50 0.11
φR beta 0.70 0.10 0.81 0.84 0.02
φπ norm 1.50 0.10 1.55 1.50 0.10
φy norm 0.50 0.05 0.48 0.52 0.05
of indexation rates to 0.5 and of autocorrelation of shocks to 0.7. Prior
means for the monetary policy rule were set at standard (Taylor, 1993) va-
lues. Priors for standard deviations of the above parameters were mainly set
to 0.1 as is common in the literature (Christoﬀel et al., 2008; Adolfson et al.,
2005). In three cases the prior distributions had to be tightened, since the
posterior estimates diverged substantially from our prior knowledge. First,
the estimate of φy was consistently close to zero, which in our view reﬂected
the fact that our sample contained a long period of disinﬂation where the
central bank payed relatively less attention to output performance than un-
der current inﬂation targeting policy. Second, the estimates of ρmH and ρmF
were estimated above 0.9, which was inconsistent with the data from Senior
Loan Oﬃcer Surveys (NBP, 2009).
Regarding shock processes, the prior means of standard deviations for
euro area shocks were set to 0.01 (Smets and Wouters, 2003). Regarding
standard deviations of domestic shocks, we also set them to 0.05 or to 0.01.
As it is shown in Kolasa (2009) the Polish economy is more volatile than the
Euro economy, thus the standard deviations of shocks must be higher. A
notable exception are shocks to LTV’s, whose prior standard deviations are
higher which and reﬂects the high variance of the loan data. Finally, we allo-
wed for the euro area shocks to be correlated, reﬂecting their non-structural
nature. The mean of the correlation coeﬃcients has been agnostically set to
zero.
The estimation was performed as follows. First, the modes of the pos-
Table 4: Prior and posterior distribution: shocks
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
type Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean St. Dev.
ρu beta 0.70 0.10 0.78 0.76 0.06
ρχ beta 0.70 0.10 0.72 0.70 0.11
ρn beta 0.70 0.10 0.72 0.70 0.11
ρA beta 0.70 0.10 0.60 0.60 0.09
ρρ beta 0.70 0.10 0.70 0.68 0.06
ρg beta 0.70 0.10 0.62 0.62 0.09
ρmH beta 0.70 0.05 0.73 0.72 0.05
ρmF beta 0.70 0.05 0.75 0.74 0.04
ρzH
D beta 0.70 0.10 0.63 0.63 0.08
ρzH
L beta 0.70 0.10 0.70 0.68 0.08
ρzF
L beta 0.70 0.10 0.55 0.55 0.09
σu invg 0.05 Inf 0.127 0.142 0.033
σχ invg 0.05 Inf 0.023 0.078 0.009
σn invg 0.05 Inf 0.023 0.052 0.009
σA invg 0.05 Inf 0.015 0.016 0.003
σρ invg 0.05 Inf 0.015 0.016 0.003
σR invg 0.01 Inf 0.002 0.002 0.000
σg invg 0.01 Inf 0.007 0.008 0.001
σmH invg 0.10 Inf 0.075 0.076 0.008
σmF invg 0.10 Inf 0.101 0.105 0.010
σzH
D invg 0.01 Inf 0.004 0.004 0.001
σzH
L invg 0.01 Inf 0.003 0.005 0.001
σzF
L invg 0.01 Inf 0.003 0.003 0.001
terior distributions have been found using Cris Sim’s csminwel procedure.
Next we applied the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with ﬁve blocks each
of 200.000 replications to approximate the complete posterior distribution.
Since the average acceptance rates amounted to 24-26% and diagnostic tests
of Brooks and Gelman (1998) conﬁrmed convergence of the Markov chains,
we used the second half of the draws to calculate posterior distributions.
These, together with the assumptions about the priors have been collected
in Tables 3 and 4.
As usually found in the literature (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003; Gra-
bek et al., 2007) we ﬁnd some persistence of shocks with autocorrelation
coeﬃcients ranging from 0.55 to 0.76. Regarding nominal rigidities we ﬁnd
relatively more wage than price stickiness, and very low indexation parame-
ters. The estimated stickiness in retail interest rates is non-negligible and
is similar for loans and deposits. The mean value of the Calvo parameter
of 0.5 implies an average period of 2 quarters between interest rate adjust-
ments. This is lower than for wages and prices and is probably related to
the fact that many interest rates are automatically indexed to the money
market rate in Poland. From the Taylor rule only the coeﬃcient of inertia is
clearly identiﬁed in the data while the remaining parameters are estimated
very close to their prior values.
Table 3: Prior and posterior distribution: structural parameters
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
type Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean St. Dev.
ξ beta 0.50 0.10 0.42 0.44 0.08
σχ norm 4.00 0.50 4.07 4.05 0.49
σc norm 2.00 0.10 1.96 2.02 0.41
σn norm 4.00 0.50 3.74 3.80 0.50
κk beta 0.20 0.05 0.19 0.20 0.05
κχ beta 0.02 0.005 0.02 0.02 0.005
ψ gamm 0.20 0.05 0.19 0.21 0.05
θW beta 0.60 0.10 0.75 0.75 0.08
θH beta 0.60 0.10 0.45 0.45 0.06
θF beta 0.60 0.10 0.83 0.83 0.04
θD beta 0.60 0.10 0.55 0.55 0.05
θL beta 0.60 0.10 0.53 0.54 0.03
θ∗
H beta 0.60 0.10 0.85 0.85 0.04
ζw beta 0.50 0.10 0.44 0.45 0.10
ζH beta 0.50 0.10 0.42 0.43 0.10
ζF beta 0.50 0.10 0.44 0.45 0.10
ζ∗
H beta 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.50 0.11
φR beta 0.70 0.10 0.81 0.84 0.02
φπ norm 1.50 0.10 1.55 1.50 0.10
φy norm 0.50 0.05 0.48 0.52 0.05
of indexation rates to 0.5 and of autocorrelation of shocks to 0.7. Prior
means for the monetary policy rule were set at standard (Taylor, 1993) va-
lues. Priors for standard deviations of the above parameters were mainly set
to 0.1 as is common in the literature (Christoﬀel et al., 2008; Adolfson et al.,
2005). In three cases the prior distributions had to be tightened, since the
posterior estimates diverged substantially from our prior knowledge. First,
the estimate of φy was consistently close to zero, which in our view reﬂected
the fact that our sample contained a long period of disinﬂation where the
central bank payed relatively less attention to output performance than un-
der current inﬂation targeting policy. Second, the estimates of ρmH and ρmF
were estimated above 0.9, which was inconsistent with the data from Senior
Loan Oﬃcer Surveys (NBP, 2009).
Regarding shock processes, the prior means of standard deviations for
euro area shocks were set to 0.01 (Smets and Wouters, 2003). Regarding
standard deviations of domestic shocks, we also set them to 0.05 or to 0.01.
As it is shown in Kolasa (2009) the Polish economy is more volatile than the
Euro economy, thus the standard deviations of shocks must be higher. A
notable exception are shocks to LTV’s, whose prior standard deviations are
higher which and reﬂects the high variance of the loan data. Finally, we allo-
wed for the euro area shocks to be correlated, reﬂecting their non-structural
nature. The mean of the correlation coeﬃcients has been agnostically set to
zero.
The estimation was performed as follows. First, the modes of the pos-Calibration and Estimation
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3.3 Impulse Response Functions
Figures 3 to 7 plot the impulse responses to various shocks together with
95% conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 3: Impulse response to a monetary policy shock






























































Figure 3 shows that following a positive monetary policy shock that leads
to the increase in the interest rate we observe a decline in the spreads on
loans (due to the stickiness of the interest rates) and a decline in loans both
to households and ﬁrms. This results in a fall of consumption and investment
which leads to a decline in output and inﬂation.
Turning to Figure 4 we can see the adjustments that take place after a
positive shock to the spread on loans to households. This shock leads to
an increase of the interest rate on loans to households and, consequently,
to a decline in loans to households which translates into a fall in consump-
tion. Eventually, GDP, inﬂation and interest rates fall. The expectations
of the fall in the interest rates lead the initial increase of investments. The
increase of investments initially outweighs the eﬀect of the consumption de-
cline (which declines slowly) and GDP increases but after a while the decline
in consumption brings GDP down.
Figure 5 shows the response of the economy to a positive shock to the
spread on loans to ﬁrms. It leads to a decline of loans to ﬁrms, and thus a
drop in investment. Loans to households initially increase and then decrease,
which results in a small increase in consumption, but it is quantitatively not
important since it is outweighed by the decline of investment. Thus, GDP
falls. The increasing spread on loans to ﬁrms raises the cost of borrowing for
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95% conﬁdence intervals.
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Figure 4: Impulse response to a spread on household loans shock.




























































Figure 5: Impulse response to a spread on loans to ﬁrms shock.




























































producers and production costs which translates into an increase in inﬂation.
Given the opposite direction of GDP and inﬂation reaction, monetary policy
reacts with only a marginal tightening.
Figure 6 shows the impact of a positive shock to the LTV for households.
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producers and production costs which translates into an increase in inﬂation.
Given the opposite direction of GDP and inﬂation reaction, monetary policy
reacts with only a marginal tightening.
Figure 6 shows the impact of a positive shock to the LTV for households.
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producers and production costs which translates into an increase in inﬂation.
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reacts with only a marginal tightening.
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Figure 7: Impulse response to a ﬁrms LTV shock

























































First, it increases loans to household and thus, consumption. There is also a
quantitatively unimportant eﬀect on loans to ﬁrms and investment. Rising
consumption leads to an increase in GDP and inﬂation, which results in an
increase in the interest rate.Calibration and Estimation
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First, it increases loans to household and thus, consumption. There is also a
quantitatively unimportant eﬀect on loans to ﬁrms and investment. Rising
consumption leads to an increase in GDP and inﬂation, which results in an
increase in the interest rate.Calibration and Estimation
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Figure 7: Impulse response to a ﬁrms LTV shock

























































First, it increases loans to household and thus, consumption. There is also a
quantitatively unimportant eﬀect on loans to ﬁrms and investment. Rising
consumption leads to an increase in GDP and inﬂation, which results in an
increase in the interest rate.
Finally, we look at the response of the economy to a positive shock to
the LTV for ﬁrms, which is shown in Figure 7. First, loosening of the credit
constraint results in an increase in loans to entrepreneurs. Since, the en-
trepreneurs know that the shock is temporary and they would not be able
to sustain higher investment in the long run they initially mostly increase
consumption and only slightly investment. Rising consumption and invest-
ment lead to higher GDP and inﬂation, which in turn result in a monetary
policy tightening and reduces investment and consumption.The Crunch
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4 The Crunch
As already noted in the introduction, there are reasons to suggest that shocks
generated by the Polish banking sector could have contributed to the slow-
down of the Polish economy during the ﬁnancial crisis. In this section we
use the estimated model to assess how strong this contribution was. As a
ﬁrst step we take a closer look at the historical decomposition of structural
shocks. These have been collected in Figure 8. In our model there are ﬁve
Figure 8: Historical shocks.





















































































shocks that can be ascribed to the banking sector, two to loan-to-value ratios
(mH and mF) and three to spreads (zH
D, zH
L and zF
L). From eyeballing Figure
8 it becomes clear that during the last observed quarters, shocks to loan-
to-value ratios assumed historical minima (note that the last observation
on each graph is zero by construction, the last observed period (2q2009) is
the last but one point). This is equivalent to a strong tightening of lending





















































































WORKING PAPER No. 75 
4
4 The Crunch
As already noted in the introduction, there are reasons to suggest that shocks
generated by the Polish banking sector could have contributed to the slow-
down of the Polish economy during the ﬁnancial crisis. In this section we
use the estimated model to assess how strong this contribution was. As a
ﬁrst step we take a closer look at the historical decomposition of structural
shocks. These have been collected in Figure 8. In our model there are ﬁve
Figure 8: Historical shocks.





















































































shocks that can be ascribed to the banking sector, two to loan-to-value ratios
(mH and mF) and three to spreads (zH
D, zH
L and zF
L). From eyeballing Figure
8 it becomes clear that during the last observed quarters, shocks to loan-
to-value ratios assumed historical minima (note that the last observation
on each graph is zero by construction, the last observed period (2q2009) is
the last but one point). This is equivalent to a strong tightening of lending
constraints by commercial banks. Regarding shocks to interest rate spreads,
the evidence is less clear. We can observe some tightening in the case of
deposit rates and household loans during the last few quarters, though these
are not extreme compared to historical experience. It should be however
noted, that the sample includes a period (late 1990’s) when the competition
in the Polish banking sector was relatively low, thus allowing for substantial
swings in interest rate spreads. The shock decomposition does not reveal
any substantial tightening in the case of spreads on enterprise loans. One
more thing that is obvious from analysing the graphs are also the extremely
strong negative shocks detected in the euro area. These aﬀected all three
foreign variables, output (y∗), inﬂation (π∗) and the interest rate (R∗). Not
surprisingly, this suggests that the slowdown of the Polish economy was also
caused by foreign factors.
To gain more insight into the impact of ﬁnancial shocks on output we run
a counterfactual scenario. To do this the model is solved in autoregressive
form:
Xt = AXt−1 + But (56)
where Xt is a vector of all endogenous variables, A and B are coeﬃcient
matrices and ut is a vector of structural shocks. Given initial values X0
and historical shocks (as presented in Figure 8), this allows for obtaining
historical time series of all endogenous variables. Our counterfactual scena-
rios involve substituting zero values for selected shocks during the last four
periods of our sample (3q2008-2q2009). However, since the impact of most
shocks takes time to feed through to the economy (as can be observed from
impulse response functions) and the scenario involves changing most recent
shocks, we extend our impact analysis for the consecutive 20 periods, running
an unconditional forecast (assuming all shocks between periods T + 1 and
T + 20 to be zero). We perform four scenarios, whose results are presented
in Figures 9 - 12.
The solid line shows the historical (model based smoothed estimate) time
series of output and its unconditional forecast. The dashed line presents the
counterfactual output series. The series deviate only from 3q2008, i.e. the
point where shock histories start to diﬀer. Finally, the dotted line shows the
diﬀerence between the two previous lines which can be interpreted as the
pure impact of the analysed scenario on output. The vertical line denotes
the point where the historical data ends and the forecast begins.
Scenario 1 assumes the absence of shocks to interest rate spreads. It can
be clearly seen that the contribution of these shocks to the slowdown was
marginal. Scenario 2 assumes the absence of LTV shocks. These have a
stronger contribution to the weakening of GDP. Scenario 3 adds the impact
of the above scenarios to see the total contribution of shocks generated by
the ﬁnancial sector to the slowdown of the real economy in Poland. Ob-
viously the impact is substantial though not overwhelming, banking sectorThe Crunch
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Figure 9: Scenario 1. GDP with and without interest rate spread shocks
after 3q 2008 (obs. 47), percentage deviations form steady state.
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Figure 10: Scenario 2. GDP with and without LTV ratios shocks after 3q
2008 (obs. 47), percentage deviations form steady state.











Note: vertical line denotes the end of sample and the beginning of unconditional forecast.
shocks can explain approximately 1.5 percent of the decline in GDP. For
comparison we also explore the impact of foreign shocks which intuitively
played a dominant role in driving the slowdown. This hypothesis is conﬁr-
med by scenario 4 (Figure 12) which assumes the absence of foreign (output,
inﬂation and interest rate) shocks during the period 3q2008-2q2009. Clearly
these shocks had a much stronger contribution to the performance of the
Polish economy than domestic banking sector shocks. According to our mo-
del the recession in the EU is responsible for a decline in Polish GDP of
approximately 2 percent.
Our results diﬀer from the ﬁnding in Gerali et al. (2009) who report a
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Figure 12: Scenario 4. GDP with and without external shocks (foreign
demand, int. rate and inﬂation shocks) after 3q 2008 (obs. 47), percentage
deviations form steady state.











Note: vertical line denotes the end of sample and the beginning of unconditional forecast.
dominating contribution of ﬁnancial sector developments on euro area out-
put. However, there are several arguments that help explain the diﬀerence.
First, the role of banking intermediation in the euro area is much higher
than in Poland. For instance the ratio of outstanding bank loans to GDP in
2008 was 116% in the euro area compared to 52% in Poland. This makes the
Polish economy less prone to a credit crunch. Second, Poland is substan-
tially more open to foreign trade than the euro area. For instance the ratio
of exports and imports of goods to GDP in 2008 was 34% in the euro area
in Figures 9 - 12.
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dominating contribution of ﬁnancial sector developments on euro area out-
put. However, there are several arguments that help explain the diﬀerence.
First, the role of banking intermediation in the euro area is much higher
than in Poland. For instance the ratio of outstanding bank loans to GDP in
2008 was 116% in the euro area compared to 52% in Poland. This makes the
Polish economy less prone to a credit crunch. Second, Poland is substan-
tially more open to foreign trade than the euro area. For instance the ratio
of exports and imports of goods to GDP in 2008 was 34% in the euro areaThe Crunch
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we construct a small open economy DSGE model with a ban-
king sector. Both, households and ﬁrms are allowed to borrow, but their
borrowing abilities are restricted by collateral requirements. The banking
sector operates under monopolistic competition and is by itself generator of
various shocks. These consist of shocks to interest rate margins and loan-
to-value ratios. Our model is capable of generating signiﬁcant and relatively
persistent eﬀects of frictions generated by the banking sector.
The model is then estimated to Polish data in order to answer the ques-
tion about the role played by the banking sector in generating the slowdown
during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-09. Our ﬁndings show some role for ﬁnan-
cial shocks. A counterfactual scenario, assuming no shocks on the side of the
banking sector in the period 3q2008-2q2009 shows that the Polish banking
sector contributed 1.5 percent to the decline in real GDP. Moreover we ﬁnd
that the bulk of impact was generated by quantitative (LTV) rather than
price (interest rate spread) shocks. Nevertheless this is still less than the
impact of foreign shocks.References
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Appendix
A The log-linearised model
The bar above a variable denotes the deterministic steady state of the va-
riable, while a hat denotes the log deviation from the the deterministic steady
state i.e. ˆ xt = logxt − log ¯ x.
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Production function

















Demand for domestic and imported intermediate goods.
ˆ yH,t = −
1 + µ
µ
ˆ pH,t + ˆ yt (A.21)
ˆ yF,t = −
1 + µ
µ
ˆ pF,t + ˆ yt (A.22)































L,t−1 + ˆ l
H
t−1 − ˆ πt) =
γI ¯ w¯ n
¯ ˜ y




















t − ξˆ c
E
t−1) + ˆ εt (A.8)
Labour demand
ˆ wt = ˆ pW,t + ˆ At + αˆ ut + α(ˆ kt−1 − ˆ nt) (A.9)
Capital utilisation
ˆ ut = Ψ[ˆ pW,t + ˆ At + (1 − α)(ˆ nt − ˆ ut − ˆ kt−1)] (A.10)
Euler
ˆ pk,t = (1 − δk)βIEt[ˆ pk,t+1 + (ˆ u
E









































L,t + ˆ l
F
t = ˆ m
F
t + Etˆ pk,t+1 + Etˆ πt+1 + ˆ kt (A.12)
Production Function









¯ pW ¯ yW
¯ ˜ y

































L,t−1 + ˆ l
F









( ˆ wt − ˆ wt−1 + ˆ πt − ζwˆ πt−1) =








(Et ˆ wt+1 − ˆ wt + Etˆ πt+1 − ζwˆ πt) (A.15)



























ˆ χt = (1 − δχ)ˆ χt−1 + δχˆ χt (A.19)
A.7 Final Good Producers
Production function

















Demand for domestic and imported intermediate goods.
ˆ yH,t = −
1 + µ
µ
ˆ pH,t + ˆ yt (A.21)
ˆ yF,t = −
1 + µ
µ
ˆ pF,t + ˆ yt (A.22)
Inﬂation.
ˆ πt = (1 − η)(¯ pF)
−1
µ (ˆ πF,t + ˆ pF,t−1) + η(¯ pH)
−1



















































H,t = ˆ p
∗
H,t + ˆ π
∗




WORKING PAPER No. 75 
Inﬂation.
ˆ πt = (1 − η)(¯ pF)
−1
µ (ˆ πF,t + ˆ pF,t−1) + η(¯ pH)
−1



















































H,t = ˆ p
∗
H,t + ˆ π
∗










H,t + ˆ π
∗






t−1) = (1 − βPθ
∗










H,t+1 − ˆ p
∗






















D,t+1 − ˆ R
H
D,t)
+ (1 − βPθD)( ˆ Rt + ˆ z
H
















L,t+1 − ˆ R
H
L,t)
+ (1 − βPθL)( ˆ Rt − ˆ z
H
L,t − ˆ R
H
L,t) (A.32)












L,t+1 − ˆ R
F
L,t)
+ (1 − βPθL)( ˆ Rt − ˆ z
F
L,t − ˆ R
F
L,t) (A.33)
Uncovered interest parity (UIP)
ˆ Rt − ˆ R
∗
t =Etˆ qt+1 − ˆ qt + Etˆ πt+1 − Etˆ π
∗
t+1 + ˆ ρt (A.34)
Risk premium. From (46) we obtain





t − ˆ ˜ yt) + εκ,t (A.35)
A.14 The Government
Government expenditures. From (48) we obtain
ˆ Gt = (1 − ρg) ˆ Gt−1 + ˆ εg,t (A.36)Appendix







H,t + ˆ π
∗






t−1) = (1 − βPθ
∗










H,t+1 − ˆ p
∗






















D,t+1 − ˆ R
H
D,t)
+ (1 − βPθD)( ˆ Rt + ˆ z
H
















L,t+1 − ˆ R
H
L,t)
+ (1 − βPθL)( ˆ Rt − ˆ z
H
L,t − ˆ R
H
L,t) (A.32)












L,t+1 − ˆ R
F
L,t)
+ (1 − βPθL)( ˆ Rt − ˆ z
F
L,t − ˆ R
F
L,t) (A.33)
Uncovered interest parity (UIP)
ˆ Rt − ˆ R
∗
t =Etˆ qt+1 − ˆ qt + Etˆ πt+1 − Etˆ π
∗
t+1 + ˆ ρt (A.34)
Risk premium. From (46) we obtain





t − ˆ ˜ yt) + εκ,t (A.35)
A.14 The Government
Government expenditures. From (48) we obtain
ˆ Gt = (1 − ρg) ˆ Gt−1 + ˆ εg,t (A.36)
Government budget. From (47) we obtain
ˆ Gt = ˆ Tt (A.37)
A.15 The Central Bank
Taylor rule. From (49) we obtain
ˆ Rt = γR ˆ Rt−1 + (1 − γR)(γπˆ πt + γyˆ ˜ yt) + ϕt (A.38)














































t = ˆ ct (A.40)
Intermediate homogeneous goods. From (52) we obtain
¯ yH









H,t = ˆ yW,t (A.41)











t = ˆ χt−1 (A.42)
Balance of Payments. From (54) we obtain
¯ pF ¯ yF
¯ ˜ y





(ˆ qt − ˆ qt−1 − ˆ π
∗
t + ˆ l
∗
t−1 + ˆ R
∗






(ˆ qt + ˆ p
∗








GDP. From (55) we obtain










H + ˆ y
∗
H + ˆ qt) −
¯ pF ¯ yF
¯ ˜ y







H,t + ˆ π
∗






t−1) = (1 − βPθ
∗










H,t+1 − ˆ p
∗






















D,t+1 − ˆ R
H
D,t)
+ (1 − βPθD)( ˆ Rt + ˆ z
H
















L,t+1 − ˆ R
H
L,t)
+ (1 − βPθL)( ˆ Rt − ˆ z
H
L,t − ˆ R
H
L,t) (A.32)












L,t+1 − ˆ R
F
L,t)
+ (1 − βPθL)( ˆ Rt − ˆ z
F
L,t − ˆ R
F
L,t) (A.33)
Uncovered interest parity (UIP)
ˆ Rt − ˆ R
∗
t =Etˆ qt+1 − ˆ qt + Etˆ πt+1 − Etˆ π
∗
t+1 + ˆ ρt (A.34)
Risk premium. From (46) we obtain





t − ˆ ˜ yt) + εκ,t (A.35)
A.14 The Government
Government expenditures. From (48) we obtain
ˆ Gt = (1 − ρg) ˆ Gt−1 + ˆ εg,t (A.36)Appendix
WORKING PAPER No. 75 1
Government budget. From (47) we obtain
ˆ Gt = ˆ Tt (A.37)
A.15 The Central Bank
Taylor rule. From (49) we obtain
ˆ Rt = γR ˆ Rt−1 + (1 − γR)(γπˆ πt + γyˆ ˜ yt) + ϕt (A.38)














































t = ˆ ct (A.40)
Intermediate homogeneous goods. From (52) we obtain
¯ yH









H,t = ˆ yW,t (A.41)











t = ˆ χt−1 (A.42)
Balance of Payments. From (54) we obtain
¯ pF ¯ yF
¯ ˜ y





(ˆ qt − ˆ qt−1 − ˆ π
∗
t + ˆ l
∗
t−1 + ˆ R
∗






(ˆ qt + ˆ p
∗








GDP. From (55) we obtain










H + ˆ y
∗
H + ˆ qt) −
¯ pF ¯ yF
¯ ˜ y
(ˆ pF + ˆ yF) (A.44)
Government budget. From (47) we obtain
ˆ Gt = ˆ Tt (A.37)
A.15 The Central Bank
Taylor rule. From (49) we obtain
ˆ Rt = γR ˆ Rt−1 + (1 − γR)(γπˆ πt + γyˆ ˜ yt) + ϕt (A.38)














































t = ˆ ct (A.40)
Intermediate homogeneous goods. From (52) we obtain
¯ yH









H,t = ˆ yW,t (A.41)











t = ˆ χt−1 (A.42)
Balance of Payments. From (54) we obtain
¯ pF ¯ yF
¯ ˜ y





(ˆ qt − ˆ qt−1 − ˆ π
∗
t + ˆ l
∗
t−1 + ˆ R
∗






(ˆ qt + ˆ p
∗








GDP. From (55) we obtain










H + ˆ y
∗
H + ˆ qt) −
¯ pF ¯ yF
¯ ˜ y
(ˆ pF + ˆ yF) (A.44)